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Summaries 
The coincidence of two independent developments led 
to the mathematization of probability from Pascal to 
de Moivre. On the one hand there are the changing implic- 
ations of probabilitas ending in a quantifiable concept, 
and on the other, the mathematization of chance within 
the area of games of chance. Probabilitas from Cicero 
to Thomas Aquinas largely takes its meaning from a pre- 
scientific dialectical method which dates back to the 
rhetoric of Aristotle. In this tradition probabilitas 
used synonymously with verisimilitudo can mean provable 
argument, credibility and convincing power. The use of 
the comparative probabilior in this connection has nothing 
to do with an order-relation. During the probabilism 
dispute the Jansenists postulated the quantifiability of 
probabilitas. This was done for the first time in the 
Port Royal Logic, based on simple methods for solving 
problems in games of chance. The conditions for the 
creations of such methods had been developed in Italy 
between 1450 and 1550. They were 1) a high standard of 
mathematics compared with the Middle Ages, combined with 
an optimistic estimation concerning the scope of appli- 
cation of mathematical methods, 2) a considerably increased 
intensity of gaming, 3) a growing emancipation from the 
church, and 4) the overcoming of the scholastic conviction 
that money is sterile. The attempts of the church to 
prohibit games of chance interrupted the process of 
mathematization. Favourable circumstances in France in 
the middle of the 17th century provided for a new begin- 
ning which led continuously to the creation of a theory 
of probability. 
Zwei voneinander unabhzngige Entwicklungen fiihrten 
durch ihr Zusammentreffen zur Mathematisierung des 
Wahrscheinlichen in der Zeit zwischen Pascal und de Moivre. 
Es handelt sich dabei urn die FJandlung des Bedeutungsinhalts 
von probabilitas bis zu einem quantifizierbaren Begriff 
und zum anderen urn das Konzept des Zufalls, das im Rahmen 
der Glccksspiele in einer Chancenverh;iltnisrechnung mathe- 
misiert wurde. Die Bedeutung des Wortes probabilitas 
von Cicero bis Thomas von Aquin ist weitgehend geprh'gt 
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von einer auf die aristotelische Rhetorik zuriickgehenden 
vorwissenschaftlichen dialektischen Schlussweise. In 
diesem Sinn wird probabilitas synonym mit verisimilitudo 
noch von Kepler in dem von iiberpriifbarem Argument, Glaub- 
wiirdigkeit bzw. fiberzeugungskraft schillernden Bereich 
verwendet, wobei Komparative wie multo probabilior noch 
nichts mit einer Ordnungsstruktur zu tun haben. Im 
Rahmen des Probabilismusstreits in der Kasuistik wurde 
von Jansenistischer Seite dann eine Quantifizierbarkeit 
von probabilitas gefordert, die in der Logik von Port 
Royal in einer ersten Phase aufgrund der inzwischen in 
der Gliicksspielrechning erfolgten Mathematisierung des 
Zuf;illigen realisiert werden konnte. Voraussetzungen fir 
die Entstehung einer Gliicksspielrechnung in Italien 
zwischen 1450 und 1550 waren 1) ein realtiv zum Mittelalter 
hoher Entwicklungsstand der Mathematik verbunden mit einer 
optimistischen Einschztzung des Anwendungsbereiches der 
mathematischen Methoden, 2) ein starker Anstieg der 
SpielintensitXt, 3) eine wachsende Unabhzngigkeit von den 
Dogmen der Kirche und schliesslich 4) die Gberwindung der 
scholastischen Auffassung von der Sterilit;it des Geldes. 
Die kirchlichen Vorbehalte gegeniiber Gliicksspielen fiihrten 
zwar zu einer Unterbrechung der Entwicklung, die aber urn 
die Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts in Frankreich wieder- 
giinstige Bedingungen fand und zu einer kontinuierlichen 
Entwicklung in Richtung auf eine Wahrscheinlickkeits- 
rechnung fiihrte. 
General ly , the literature refers to the correspondence 
between Pascal and Fermat in 1654 when pointing to the beginning 
of a mathematical discipline called the theory of probability 
[Todhunter 1865; Maistrov 19741. If one respects the early 
Italian attempts of the late 15th and 16th century to solve 
problems of games of chance, a preliminary phase of this latter- 
day subject seems to be found [2]. In recent years, research 
based on modern philosophical concepts of probability has 
revealed corresponding concepts in the scholastic theology and 
philosophy of Thomas Aquinas [Byrne 19681 and in the mediaeval 
commentaries on the Talmud [Rabinovitch 19731. The origins of 
the development of the theory of probability have therefore 
become more complex. One can get rid of these complications if 
one concentrates on the question of how a calculus of probab- 
ilities evolved. To answer this question, one focuses only on 
those results of inductive logic which were integrated into this 
growing calculus. 
A calculus of probabilities was created for the first time 
in the Ars conjectandi by James Bernoulli. “Probability” or 
“probabilitas” does not appear in the calculations concerning 
games of chance made before James Bernoulli [3]. The calculus 
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of games of chance was a calculus of chance proportions, seen 
before the 18th century as a part of arithmetic or algebra. The 
basic problem of this calculus was the following: the distri- 
bution of the stakes in the game is decided by chance. A deci- 
sion instrument like a die or a coin or a game of cards is re- 
sponsible for the chance event. All these decision instruments 
show a perfect physical symmetry concerning the possible out- 
comes. The physical symmetry allows us to find the chance 
proportions by a simple counting of the favourable possibilities 
for the chance event. If one relates the number of these poss- 
ibilities to those possibilities favourable for the complement- 
ary event the chance proportion is found. 
The coincidence of several different factors was respons- 
ible for the development of this calculus of chance proportions 
in the Mediterranean area in the late 15th century. Firstly, 
the number of different games of chance and the gambling activ- 
ity of people increased considerably. One reason was the 
extension of commerce and of communication with foreign count- 
ries occurringin the 14th and 15th century. Many games of 
chance were games of cards. The crusaders had brought playing 
cards to Europe at the end of the 13th century. They became 
popular in Europe only after European countries were able to 
produce paper, from the 14th and 15th centuries onward. One 
learns from details given in the numerous clerical and secular 
prohibitions that games of chance were seen as a model of the 
commercial enterprise of the time. The profession of a merchant 
was the most attractive because of its possibilities for social 
advancement, and the most adventurous because of its risks. To 
cover those risks, especially in the maritime trade, bets as a 
kind of insurance had developed from the 14th century on. 
Simultaneously, a banking system was developed which was closely 
connected with the commercial activities. All this forced the 
church, from the 15th century on, to moderate its severe atti- 
tude towards usury. This resulted in the concept of the ster- 
ility of money being given up. This also favoured the beginning 
of enterprises similar to lotteries from the 16th century on. 
An enormous interest in antiquity during the Renaissance 
brought a tendency to imitate even the way of living of the 
Roman emperors. Connected with that was a growing indifference 
towards clerical authority. All these factors contributed to 
the enormous gaming activity from the 15th century onwards. 
Mathematics, which was mainly oriented to practical, commercial 
needs and which had at the beginning of the 16th century out- 
scored the Greek mathematics for the first time by the algebraic 
solution of the cubic equation, seemed ready to solve simple 
problems in games of chance. The mathematical treatment of 
these problems shows very early apologetic symptoms. The ideal 
conditions of the dies, cards and so on and the so-called prin- 
ciple of a just game had the double function of rendering those 
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problems soluble and demonstrating the games to be legal. The 
furious opposition of the Catholic and the Protestant churches 
in the second half of the 16th century surely contributed to the 
interruption of the development of the calculus in Italy. In 
the middle of the 17th century gaming became en vogue in France. 
The geographical and political distance between Rome and the 
French court, a society whose members thought the admonitions of 
the church irrelevant to them, created an atmosphere in which a 
mathematician could work on problems of games of chance without 
any fear of repression. Furthermore, the belief in the effic- 
iency of mathematics had reached its highest peak with the new 
algebra of Vibte and Descartes [Mahoney 1971; Schneider 19741. 
In this atmosphere, Pascal started to discuss gaming prob- 
lems with Fermat and started a development leading directly to 
the modern theory of probability. However, the possibility for 
this development arose only after the connection was made be- 
tween the probabilitas-concept, used in philosophy and theology, 
and the calculus of chance proportions. Only then do we find 
the expectation of extending the applications of the calculus, 
which had changed from a calculus of chance proportions to a 
calculus of probabilities. Mathematics now tried to cover the 
fields of application of the old probabilitas-concept, such as 
law and problems closely connected with medicine concerning life 
expectancy and annuities. James Bernoulli articulated these 
hopes of the mathematicians in the Ars conjectandi. In his 
“fourth book” he formulated a program for the possible appli- 
cations of his “art of conjecturing”, on the full realization of 
which we are still working. 
This may suffice to motivate an interest in the conditions 
which led to the connection found in James Bernoulli’s and 
de Moivre’s work between the two roots of a calculus of prob- 
abilities . The first quantification of the probabilitas-concept 
in the form of proportions between probabilities corresponding 
to the chance proportions appears in the last chapter of the 
Port Royal Logic first published in 1662. The need for such a 
quantification results from the probabilism dispute between the 
Jansenists and the Jesuits. This quarrel became notorious in 
Pascal’s Lettres Provinciales from l&6/7 onwards. 
The moral-theological problem was to evaluate opinions 
(opiniones) as more or less what is referred to as probabilitas. 
The central question dealt with in these opinions was how one 
could judge a certain deed as sinful or not. An extensive 
casuistic literature showed that some authors would see the same 
deed as a crime and others as a guiltless act, according to the 
circumstances. 
Despite the distinction between the greater or lesser 
probabilitas of an opinion, objective criteria to compare two 
probabilitates were lacking. The basic meaning of probabilitas 
at that time leads back to the word endoxos and synonyms like 
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eikos, pithanos, and pistos in the works of Aristotle. Endoxos 
has to do with the convincing power of an argument, for example, 
for a bill in a political debate. Endoxos relates even to the 
authority of a person who argues or formulates an opinion. That 
means that an argument can become endoxos by the authority of 
its author. Finally endoxos is contrasted with “demonstrable” 
concerning propositions, and serves to distinguish between true 
knowledge and a body of convictions which are only probable 
(verisimilis). The probabili tas- concept took over the meaning 
of endoxos. This one can demonstrate in a tradition starting 
with the rhetoric of Cicero and reaching beyond Thomas Aquinas. 
Kepler shows at the beginning of the 17th century that the 
domain of probabilis and verisimilis is still completely separat- 
ed from that of chance, as in dicing. 
Kepler uses probabilis and verisimilis synonymously and 
exclusively to characterize propositions which he calls opiniones. 
A typical example is Tycho Brahe’s proposition that comets move 
outside the sublunar sphere on circles. This proposition is 
opposed by Kepler, who was convinced that comets move in a 
straight line. These opinions are backed by arguments, phen- 
omena, signs. The probabilism dispute then brought the final 
step of objectifying the probabilitas-concept in the Port Royal 
Logic [Hacking 19751. To support the proposition: “This woman 
is pregnant”, one can offer the criterion that she is pale-faced. 
But this argument will not convince completely of the pregnancy, 
of which we have only a probable opinion. Opinion, as lacking 
complete certitude of the truth of a proposition, gives 
probabilis now the function of describing the degree of credib- 
ility of a proposition. To avoid all the difficulties concern- 
ing belief, faith, self-love of the human-being, only the past, 
present or future outcome of events is discussed. 
The last chapter of the Port Royal Logic deals with future 
events. Arguments for the proposition that a certain event will 
happen use criteria generally observed with such events. As 
examples for future events, only games of chance and lotteries 
are described. The criteria in this case are nothing else than 
the different possibilities of the decision instrument used in 
the game of chance. These possibilities can be counted. So for 
the first time the probabilitas-concept became independent of a 
subjective belief. The connection between the probabilitas con- 
cept and the chance proportions in the Ars cogitandi of Port 
Royal not only caused James Bernoulli to create his Ars conject- 
andi but at the same time provided the roots for the distinction 
between a subjective and an objective probability, already found 
in James Bernoulli’s work. 
NOTES 
1. This article is a revision of a paper presented at the 
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XIV-th International Congress of the History of Science, 
Tokyo, Japan, August 1974. 
2. As early as 1865, Todhunter pointed to this Italian develop- 
merit. More recent research in this field is described in 
[David 19621 and [Kendall 19561. 
3. Except for the Laws of Chance of 1692, an enlarged English 
edition of Huygens’ paper of 1657, in which Huygens’ chance 
proportions in the special case of equal chances were trans- 
lated into equal probabilities. 
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